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Abstract 
Any discussion on improving the existing arrangements for assessing and managing 
financial risks and in particular supervising the relevant institutions will also need to 
address the question on which institution should be responsible for which task and 
for which sector of the financial system, how these institutions should be organized 
and, if there are several, how they should interact with each other. 
Based on the example of the European Union, this paper shows the gradual change 
from a rather loose rather idealistic cooperative framework among entirely independ-
ent institutions, over the right to contribute to the functioning of policies set by others, 
on to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, a centralized structure in which – at least 
for the banking sector - the ECB takes on a rather powerful role of policy making, 
oversight and enforcement. 
  
                                                
*  Gregor Heinrich, Systemic Policy Partnership, gh@the-spp.com; www.gregorheinrich.info; www.the-
spp.com. The paper was presented at the conference, “Financial Stability, Interconnectedness, and 
risk assessment in the Caribbean”, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 19-20 March 2015. The 
views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of SPP or any of its 
associates. 
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Any discussion on improving the existing arrangements for assessing and managing 
financial risks and in particular supervising the relevant institutions will also need to 
address the question on which institution should be responsible for which task and 
for which sector of the financial system, how these institutions should be organized 
and, if there are several, how they should interact with each other. 
This can already be a challenging issue in a merely national context. It is even more 
so in an international, transnational or regional context. 
In Europe, the launch of the so-called Banking Union on June 29, 2012, was 
arguably the European Union’s most consequential policy initiative since the start of 
its financial crisis in mid-2007. 
Interconnectedness of financial activity and financial institutions, another topic of this 
conference, obviously generates the question whether supervision can be left as 
hitherto to national institutions that at best cooperate with each other and exchange 
information on the basis of MoUs, or whether a different framework might better be 
suited to face and manage the existing cross border challenges. 
In the Caribbean there is a certain interest in knowing about the European experi-
ence in designing a financial stability architecture, as the European Union is in some 
way a group of countries that are increasingly integrated at the economic, monetary, 
trade and infrastructure levels. 
                                                
*  Gregor Heinrich, Systemic Policy Partnership, gh@the-spp.com; www.gregorheinrich.info; www.the-
spp.com. The paper was presented at the conference, “Financial Stability, Interconnectedness, and 
risk assessment in the Caribbean”, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 19-20 March 2015. The 
views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of SPP or any of its 
associates. 
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While there are some things that seem to be in common, there are also many 
differences that would probably require a more differentiated approach. 
In this presentation I plan to 
I.  Highlight some of the commonalities and differences between the two regions 
II.  Offer an overview of the various steps that led to the current European 
arrangements. 
III.  And offer some examples of ongoing challenges. 
I.	  The	  Caribbean	  and	  the	  EU	  -­‐	  Commonalities	  and	  differences	  	  
The Caribbean has, in the form of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the 
Caribbean Common Market, both founded in 19731, a framework that aims to 
achieve improvements in trade, production, competitiveness and also enhanced 
functional cooperation in areas such as health, communications, technological 
developments, etc. But its objectives do not – at the moment at least – mention 
economic policy, financial services or financial stability.  
In contrast, the European Union treaty (and its predecessor, the Treaty on the 
European Community) clearly state as one the activities the adoption of a common 
economic policy and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and 
exchange-rate policy. And the European Union Treaty then created the European 
System of Central Banks and the ECB, and single currency, the euro. 
At this time, the Caribbean countries do not have a single common currency a 
Caribbean System of Central Banks or a single central bank (with the exception of 
the countries that share the Eastern Caribbean central bank).  
It does not - yet - have a shared safety net in the form of a joint deposit insurance 
scheme or single resolution fund – but neither does the European Union, even 
though it is working on it in the framework of the so-called Banking Union. 
As regards financial infrastructure, the EU does have a common payment system 
across national borders in the EU in form of the TARGET platform2 for Eurosystem 
banks, and the ECB performs its payment system oversight tasks3 on the basis of the 
standards and recommendations it has developed by itself or else in cooperation with 
other central banks and authorities. Standards and recommendations are harmo-
nised, and systematic oversight of payment; clearing and securities settlement make 
it easier to compare assessments of different systems. 
                                                
1  The Treaty of Chaguaramas which established the Caribbean Community including the Caribbean 
Common Market was signed by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on 4th July, 
1973, in Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago. It came into effect on 1 August 1973. Revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy, http://www.caricom.org 
2  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2/about/vision/html/index.en.html. On transaction volumes (also of 
other payment and settlement systems in Europe see CPMI (2014). 
3  See for instance ECB (2015). 
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Without a common currency in the Caribbean, it is understandable that there is also 
not yet a joint payment system or a formal joint payment system oversight structure.4 
On the other hand, the Caribbean does have the oldest regional network of bank 
supervisors in the world, the Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors (CGBS)5, 
established 1983. 
It has the specific mandate to enhance and coordinate the harmonization of the bank 
supervisory practices in the English speaking Caribbean, with a view to bringing 
them in line with internationally accepted practices. 
As far as I can tell, the CGBS does share some guidelines or handbooks of their 
members, the Group does not yet seem to elaborate or enforce a joint governance 
structure, regulation or supervision. 
As regards the private sector self-organisation, Europe has its influential European 
Banking Federation (EBF)6; in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Association of Banks 
(CAB) is a common platform that seeks to influence regional financial service 
policies.7 
Caribbean countries, at least the English-speaking ones, also have one advantage 
over European Union countries: they share a common language, a common legal 
tradition and there are fairly large similarities in cultural heritage. This could actually 
be very helpful in strengthening a cooperative framework in the region. 
Finally, but that will come as no surprise to you there are enormous differences in the 
financial size of the overall financial market or institutions in the EU as compared to 
the Caribbean.  But both Europe and the Caribbean host internationally active 
institutions, and in the Caribbean, financial conglomerates and other institutions with 
complex ownership structures tend to control a large market share simultaneously in 
several countries of the region.8 And, as an IMF study of 2013 highlighted, the 
relative size of the sector in the Caribbean could be a source of risk and concern:9 
II.	  Developing	  a	  European	  Financial	  Architecture	  	  
But now allow me to offer an overview of the various steps that led to the current 
European Financial Architecture and the motivation behind these steps  
                                                
4 Heinrich (2007). 
5  http://www.cgbsnet.org  
6  http://www.ebf-fbe.eu  
7  http://www.caibinc.info/about_us 
8  Ogawa, Park, et al (2013). 
9  Ogawa, Park, et al, (2013): “The financial sector in the Caribbean is large relative to the size of the 
economies and dominated by banks, although non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are becoming 
important. The total assets of the financial sector, excluding offshore banks, amount to 
124 percent of the regional GDP, with the banking system accounting for some 91 percent and non-
bank financial institutions such as credit unions and insurance companies accounting for the rest. 
The Bahamas and Barbados have significant offshore banking sectors, equivalent to 72 times and 
11 times their respective economies, far outstripping the size of the onshore sector.”  
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Like many reforms, the reforms that led to the current structure of European financial 
architecture have its origins in crises. 
Crises have one big advantage: they spur creative thinking, at least for a while, make 
those affected huddle together and offer motivation to find a solution that will 
hopefully prevent a next crisis, or at least make the next crisis less costly for the 
society as a whole. 
The last worldwide financial crisis comes of course to mind when we think about 
incentives to strengthen financial stability, in particular at the level of the G20 
countries via the Financial Stability Board. And in the Caribbean, I would say, the 
collapse of the CL Financial Group10 was also an event that triggered thinking of 
whether something can be done to prevent similar events in the future. 
Not only a crisis can provoke new thinking. Also a major change in underlying 
structures can result in the need to find new rules, regulations and even institutional 
arrangements. 
In the Caribbean for instance this has happened when countries became independ-
ent, in Europe, a strong incentive – actually a need - to change structures came with 
the introduction of the euro as a common currency for most countries of the 
European Union. 
In Europe, the crisis exposed fault lines in governance, and deficiencies in the 
architecture of the financial supervisory and regulatory framework.  In particular, 
momentous events such as the freezing of interbank markets, the loss of confidence 
in financial institutions, runs on banks and difficulties affecting cross-border financial 
groups, questioned the ability of the EU financial stability architecture to contain 
threats to the integrated single financial market. The need for more effective micro 
and macro-prudential regulation and supervision, but also for better coordination 
between the two as well as amongst regulators, was underscored.  The crisis has 
also confirmed that central banks can play an important role in safeguarding financial 
stability. 
The crisis has prompted critical thinking about the EU economic and financial policy 
frameworks and the need for a new supervisory architecture and indeed the need for 
a comprehensive crisis management regime.  Not that this was not understood 
earlier.  
The lack of harmonisation in the European legal and supervisory framework and its 
potential cost in managing crises were known.11 
                                                
10  In particular, the insurance sector was affected by the collapse of the CL Financial Group, the largest 
insurance company in the region. This group’s total assets were estimated at about US$16 billion, 
equivalent to around 30 percent of the Caribbean region’s GDP, operating in at least 28 countries. 
CL Financial was regarded as a successful example of financial integration of companies within the 
region. Weak corporate governance, high interest rate annuity products with corresponding high risk 
investments, and high leverage led to the collapse of the group, bringing significant spillover effects 
to the Caribbean region; Ogawa, Park et al (2013) p. 13.  
11  See Recine/Teixeira (2009). 
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But we need to step back even further, as there were reforms of the institutional 
architecture of financial regulation and supervision also before the recent financial 
crisis. At the risk of not entering into all details or covering all sectors of the financial 
system, a chronological overview might be of help.  
It will show the gradual change from a rather loose rather idealistic cooperative 
framework among entirely independent institutions, over the right to contribute to the 
functioning of policies set by others, on to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, a 
centralized structure in which – at least for the banking sector - the ECB takes on a 
rather powerful role of policy making, oversight and enforcement. 
1)	  1985	  Commission	  White	  Paper	  	  
In June 1985 the Commission presented a rather short document to the Council, 
highlighting steps that would be needed to complete the internal market. The 
document focused on three main areas: the removal of physical barriers, the removal 
of technical barriers, the removal of fiscal barriers, and a timetable to complete these 
steps by 1992. 
The interesting part for us is that as part of the removal of technical barriers, it 
mentions a common market for financial services, thus introducing the single market 
approach to financial services as well as introducing the concept of “home country 
control”.12 
At the time there was no talk of strong harmonisation of surveillance standards, 
institutional linkages and even less of a centralised authority. 
The report states, for instance (emphasis added):  
“The Commission considers that it should be possible to facilitate the exchange of 
such financial products at a Community level, using a minimal coordination of 
rules (especially on such matters as authorisation; financial supervision and reorgani-
sation winding up, etc.) as the basis for mutual recognition by Member States of what 
each does to safeguard the interests of the public” 
And: 
“Such harmonisation particularly as regards the supervision of ongoing activities 
should be guided by the principle of "home country control".  This means attrib-
uting the primary task of supervising the financial institution to the competent authori-
ties of its Member State of origin to which would have to be communicated all infor-
mation necessary for supervision. The authorities, of the Member State, which is the 
destination of the service, whilst not deprived of all power, would have a complemen-
tary role.  There would have to be a minimum harmonisation of surveillance 
standards, though the need to reach agreement on this must not be allowed further to 
delay the necessary and overdue decisions.” 
                                                
12  European Commission (1985).  
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2)	  1989	  –	  Delors	  Report	  	  
In April 1989 a committee of experts under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors 
presented their Report 13 under the mandate of the European Council “to study and 
propose concrete stages “leading towards economic and monetary union” in the 
European Community. The report laid the groundwork amongst other for the 
upcoming monetary union and also highlighted some interesting challenges that 
would eventually be solved only by creating a centralised institution. 
For instance: 
“Well before the decision to fix exchange rates permanently, the full liberalization of 
capital movements and financial market integration would have created a situation in 
which the coordination of monetary policy would have to be strengthened progres-
sively. Once every banking institution in the Community is free to accept deposits 
from, and to grant loans to, any customer in the Community and in any of the national 
currencies, the large degree of territorial coincidence between a national central 
bank's area of jurisdiction, the area in which its currency is used and the area in 
which 'its' banking system operates will be lost. 
In these circumstances the effectiveness of national monetary policies will become 
increasingly dependent on cooperation among central banks. Indeed, the growing 
coordination of monetary policies will make a positive contribution to financial market 
integration and will help central banks gain the experience that would be necessary to 
move to a single monetary policy.” 
The Report also addresses institutional arrangements. Evidently, a new monetary 
institution would be needed because a single monetary policy cannot result from 
independent decisions and actions by different central banks. The report suggested 
that the domestic and international monetary policy making of the Community should 
be organised in a federal form: the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
consisting of a central institution and the national central banks. 
One of the functions of the new ESCB, apart from commitment to price-stability, and 
the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, was 
that: 
“…the System would participate in the coordination of banking supervision policies of 
the supervisory authorities.” 
So at the time no more than a participation in the coordination of supervisory policies 
was foreseen, and the supervisory authorities were still seen as very separate 
entities. In fact, the Report does not really address issues of banking supervision or 
financial stability. 
                                                
13  Delors, J. (1989). 
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3)	  1992	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  	  
The main recommendations of the Delors Report were agreed in the Maastricht 
Treaty (formally the “Treaty on European Union”), signed on 7 February 1992, 
and entered into force on 1 November 1999.14 
The Treaty addressed many issues relating to the existing treaties of the European 
Community but the most important – with regard to today’s conference - were the 
rules that set out the framework for the European Monetary Union and single 
currency, including the European Monetary Institute, the European System of Central 
Banks and the ECB.  
The Treaty also contained some provisions, which, in hindsight show how national 
governments wished to keep some control over financial institutions and their 
supervision. 
While on the one hand the Treaty prohibited all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between Member States (and between Member states and third countries) 
and also prohibited any restrictions on payments (Article 73 b), it did allow for 
Member states to take measures that would prevent infringements on national law 
and regulations in the field of prudential supervision of financial institutions (Art 73 d).  
But it does give the ESCB the authority to at least 
“Contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the finan-
cial system.”  
This was rather a consulting role and the rule making and surveillance authority 
clearly remained with national authorities. However, the Treaty also laid some 
groundwork for a stronger involvement of the ECB in prudential supervision, albeit 
not without requiring the passing of several hurdles (Art 105, 6).  
 
“The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the ECB and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, confer 
upon the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance 
undertakings “.  
Another interesting part of the Treaty is that it addresses, for the first time in the 
process, as far as I can tell, financial stability. A section in the Protocol on the ESCB 
mentions that the ESCB shall contribute not only to the smooth conduct of policies 
                                                
14  Original text: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1992:191:TOC, consolidated 
Version 2012: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN.  
Entry into force of  Maastricht Treaty: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_1993_293_R_0061_063&rid=1 
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relating to the supervision of credit institutions by the competent national authorities 
but the ESCB shall also contribute to the stability of the financial system. 15 
4)	  1999	  –	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro	  and	  subsequent	  architecture	  reports	  
a)	  Euro	  introduction	  -­‐	  1999	  
The euro, as you know, came into force on 1 January 1999, first as an accounting 
currency, while physical euro coins and banknotes entered into circulation on 1 
January 2002. 
After the introduction of the euro in 1999, the debate on the financial stability 
architecture in the EU focused on the adequacy of a decentralised setting based on 
national responsibilities for preventing and managing crises.  
The Financial Services Action Plan in 199916 and the introduction of the Lamfalussy 
process for financial regulation and supervision in 200117 enhanced the decentralised 
arrangements by increasing significantly the level of legal harmonisation and 
supervisory cooperation.  
In addition, authorities adopted EU-wide Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to 
safeguard cross-border financial stability.  
b)	  Financial	  Services	  Action	  Plan	  (FSAP)	  –	  1999	  
Originally adopted in 1999, the FSAP was an ambitious programme touching upon 
securities, the pension sector, the insurance sector, mortgages, and banking 
(including anti money-laundering initiatives).  
It had four key strategic objectives:  
• developing a single European market in wholesale financial services;  
• creating open and secure retail markets;  
• ensuring financial stability through establishing state of the art prudential rules 
and supervision; and 
                                                
15  Art 3.3, PROTOCOL, on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank  
16  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/policy/archive_en.htm#fsap; 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/actionplan/index_en.htm 
See also the study “Evaluation of the economic impacts of the Financial Services Action Plan, March 
2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/090707_economic_impact_en, 
and the study on the cost of compliance with selected FSAP measures, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/090707_cost_of_compliance_en.
pdf, and  
17  Final report of the Committee of Wise Men on the regulation of securities markets, 15.2.2001, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-
men_en.pdf. 
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• setting wider conditions for an optimal single financial market.  
To meet these four strategic objectives, the FSAP introduced 42 measures each with 
their own operational objectives (such as increasing market confidence, harmonising 
information etc.).18  
The measures also included strengthening the rules on prudential supervision. 
Interestingly, these measures were based in part on the shortcomings of “Basel I”, 
mainly its lack of risk sensitivity – shortcomings that were then also the focus of the 
so-called Basel II and more recently Basel II19I efforts. 
 
The FSAP also mentioned the importance of ensuring the continued stability of EU 
financial markets.  
It made it clear that regulatory safeguards need to keep pace with new sources of 
financial risk and state-of the-art supervisory practice in order to contain systemic or 
institutional risk (e.g. capital adequacy, solvency margins for insurance) and take 
account of changing market realities (where institutions are organised on a pan-
European, cross-sectorial basis).  
Suggested measures include:20 
• moves to bring banking, insurance and securities prudential legislation up to the 
highest standards, taking account of the work of existing bodies such as the 
Basle Committee and FESCO - Forum of European Securities Commissions 
(adoption of proposed Directives on winding-up and liquidation of banks and in-
                                                
18  There are several Directives, communications, recommendations and regulations related to the 
banking industry in the FSAP. These include:  -­‐ Recommendation 2001/193 (C(2001)447) on pre-contractual information to be given to con-
sumers by lenders offering home loans;  -­‐ COM(2000)36 and COM(2003)718 on retail payments and a new legal framework for pay-
ments in the Internal Market;  -­‐ Regulation 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in euro;  -­‐ Directive 2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions;  -­‐ Directive 2000/46/EC on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of 
electronic money institutions (E-Money Directive);  -­‐ Directive 2001/97/EC amending Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering – Commission Declaration (2nd Money 
Laundering Directive);  -­‐ Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
(recast) and Directive 2006/49/EC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit insti-
tutions (recast) (CRD);  -­‐ Directive 2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance under-
takings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (Financial Conglomerates Directive); 
and  -­‐ Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (Savings 
Tax Directive).  
19  www.bis.org/bcbs; http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm;  
20  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-99-327_en.htm?locale=en 
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surance companies and on electronic money, amendment to the money launder-
ing Directive, proposals to amend capital framework for banks and investment 
firms and amend solvency margins for insurance companies)  
• work on prudential supervision of financial conglomerates (proposal for Directive)  
• arrangements to increase cross-sectoral discussion and cooperation between 
authorities on issues of common concern (creation of a Securities Advisory 
Committee). 
 
The latter point is of interest, as among the identified shortcomings was:21  
• Absence of requirement for supervisory cooperation:  
o in an increasingly cross-border market authorities must cooperate ef-
fectively with each other in the supervision of cross-border groups to 
reduce regulatory burdens; and  
• Absence of proper market disclosures:  
o the previous Directives do not facilitate effective market discipline 
through provision of reliable information for market participants to 
make well-founded assessments.  
The old EU system thus lacked the flexibility to keep pace with rapid developments in 
financial markets and risk management practices, and with improvements in 
regulatory and supervisory tools.  
Regulatory failure due to the increasingly obsolete nature of Basel 1 was increasingly 
possible. 
 While as result of the FSAP cooperation and exchange of information was strength-
ened, and rules were further harmonized, no fundamental changes were made in the 
governance – or architecture of the framework to strengthen financial stability  
c)	  Lamfalussy	  Report	  –	  2001	  
Also the so-called Lamfalussy Report of 2001,22 aimed at strengthening securities 
markets in Europe, recommended strengthening cooperation between financial 
market regulators. Interestingly it also recommends including in the cooperation the 
institutions in charge of micro and macro supervision and cross-sectoral regulators. 
And it proposed to create a structure with various bodies at different levels, each 
responsible for a concrete task in the process of regulating the securities markets.  
This in turn would require action by Economic and Finance Committee, European 
Central Bank and national central banks, European Commission, European 
Parliament, Member States and European regulators.  
                                                
21  European Commission (2004).  
22  Above, footnote 17. 
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d)	  A	  first	  series	  of	  reform	  steps	  
Indeed, the actions and reports mentioned above resulted in a number of important 
reform packages: 
In Dec 2002 – ECOFIN, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council23, published a 
reform of the institutional architecture of financial regulation and supervision in the 
EU.24 
The main aim of this reform — which followed a similar reform conducted in the field 
of the securities markets — is to solve the problems that have been experienced with 
the EU legislative process in the past. The reform tried to adapt the Lamfalussy 
recommendations report to the banking market and introduced a sectoral and 
decentralised model of financial regulation and supervision, which is neutral as 
concerns the institutional arrangements of such functions at national level and was to 
ensure the cooperation between the national regulators and supervisors of financial 
markets across countries. 
One needs to be aware that the complexity of the structure is also due to the fact that 
each member state had, and still has, different models of institutional organization 
and distinct degrees of participation by central banks in these tasks in the case of 
euro area countries.  
In this debate, the European Central Bank favoured an institutional framework in 
which the exercise of monetary policy in the euro area is accompanied by strong 
responsibility on the part of national central banks in relation to the task of banking 
supervision as well as by strengthened cooperation among countries in this area.  
From the perspective of the European Central Bank, the attribution of ample 
supervisory responsibility (in both macro- and microprudential supervision contexts) 
to central banks in the euro area, with the scope extending beyond banking, was 
considered desirable from two points of view:25  
Above all it allowed banking supervisors (central banks and/or agencies) to use their 
network of contacts in order to better assess potential systemic risks, and secondly, 
to make possible a closer implicit coordination with the monetary policy function. 
Against this background, the European Central Bank has defined financial stability 
“…as a condition in which the financial system would be able to withstand shocks, 
without giving way to cumulative processes which impair the allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities and the processing of payments in the economy”. 26  
 
                                                
23  ECOFIN is one of the oldest configurations of the Council of the European Union; it is made up of 
the economics and finance ministers of all the 28 union member states. The Council is responsible 
for EU policy in economic policy, taxation issues and the regulation of financial services; 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/ecofin/  
24  See “Nieto/Peñalosa (2004). 
25  Nieto/Peñalosa (2004). 
26  Padoa-Schioppa (2002). 
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The “European regulatory system for the singe financial market” entailed no transfer 
of supervisory authority to the Community; rather it created a network of Committee 
structures.  
The Lamfalussy committee-structure for financial regulation and supervision.27 
 Banking Insurance and pensions Securities 
Regulatory 
committees  
(Level 2) 
European Banking 
Committee (EBC) 
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions 
Committee (EIOPC) 
European Securities 
Committee (ESC) 
Committee of 
supervisors 
(Level 3) 
Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) 
(London) 
Committee on European 
Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Supervisors 
(CEIPOS) 
(Frankfurt) 
Committee of European 
Securities Regulators 
(CESR) 
(Paris) 
 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was established in 2004, it 
was composed of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central 
banks of the European Union. It acted as independent body in charge of advising 
and coordinating on banking regulation and supervision in the European Union (EU). 
It was replaced in 2011 by the European Banking Authority28 as part of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), but more on that later. 
Committees are of course a well-established way to recognize and maintain the 
authority, sovereignty, independence and at times very different cultural, legislative 
and institutional background of the individual constituents; but decision making can 
be slow and cumbersome. While Committees are a reasonably good structure for 
information exchange and the preparation of rules that require a broad consensus, 
the structure may perhaps not be ideal if decisions need to be taken in a crisis 
situation. 
e)	  Memorandum	  of	  understanding	  (2003,	  2005,	  2008)	  
The institutions tried do overcome shortfalls of such a relatively loose Committee 
structure with the “Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the 
Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in 
Financial Crisis situations”, published on 18 May 2005 that entered into force on 
1 July 2005.29 An earlier MoU was published in 2003, but that one did not involve 
Finance Ministers.30 
                                                
27  From: Recine/Teixeira (2009) 
28  www.eba.europa.eu  
29  Press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html, and 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/memorandum-of-understanding-on-co-operation-in-financial-crisis-
situations . 
30  “Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation between the banking 
supervisors and central banks of the European Union in crisis management situations”, 10 March 
2003; press release: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html 
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The MoU – which is not a public document - set forth practical arrangements aimed 
at promoting co-operation between authorities in crisis or potential crisis situations 
without overriding their respective institutional responsibilities or restricting their 
capacity for independent and timely decision-making in their respective fields of 
competence, notably with regard to the conduct of day-to-day central banking and 
supervisory tasks, as set out in national and Community legislation. 
So again, national competence was not touched. Furthermore, while such a MoU 
was an important step forward, it was nevertheless a non-legally binding instrument. 
5)	  The	  financial	  crisis	  2007/2008	  
Genuine structural changes came about only in the aftermath of the recent financial 
crisis. 
The financial crisis started in Europe in 2007 with first reported sub-prime related 
losses and then in August 2007 the freezing of interbank markets. In June 2008 there 
was yet another MoU, as mentioned above, on cross-border financial stability, and in 
September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  
The financial crisis as from 2007/08 challenged fundamental assumptions regarding 
the functioning and expansion of the single financial market. 31 
It highlighted in particular the so-called “trilemma of financial stability” according to 
which (1) a stable financial system, (2) an integrated financial system and (3) 
national financial autonomy are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be 
combined but not all three; one has to give. 32 
The single banking market was built on the premise that banks conduct the majority 
of their business at home and only branch out to other EU countries on a modest 
scale. This premise is no longer true. Already in 2009, some of the major European 
banks such as Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas and UniCredit conducted more 
business cross-border than at home.  
The single market in a way became weighed down by its own success The 
incompatibility - within the financial stability trilemma - derives basically from the fact 
that the single financial market was constructed in a setting where market integration 
is managed on the basis of home- host-country relationships and where the 
economic benefits of integration are spread and shared among Member States. 
  
Conversely the common economic risks stemming from the increased financial 
integration are not mutualised but rather dealt with on the basis of national responsi-
bilities, as long as regulators and governments remain only accountable to national 
parliaments and taxpayers.  
                                                
31  See “Driving European Recovery”, communication for the Spring European Council, 4.3.2009, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0114:FIN:EN:PDF 
32  Schoenmaker (2009) and (2011) See also Schoenmaker/Osterloo (2014). 
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In this context, the financial crisis has proved to be a major challenge to the ongoing 
process of European financial integration. In particular, the crisis has demonstrated 
the importance of an effective macro-prudential supervision, aimed at a broad and 
effective monitoring and assessment of the potential risks covering all components of 
the financial system.33  
6)	  de	  Larosière	  Report	  –	  2009	  and	  its	  impact	  
These needs for reform became documented in particular after European Commis-
sion President Barroso conferred a mandate to Jacques de Larosière in October 
2008 to chair an outstanding group of people to give advice on the future of 
European financial regulation and supervision, and to consider how the European 
supervisory arrangements could be strengthened both to better protect its citizens 
and to rebuild trust in the financial system. 
The sequence of steps undertaken in that period was surprisingly fast. 
The report, known as the De Larosière Report was finished in February and 
published in March 2009.34 
A few days later, the Commission issued on the one hand a Communication on 
“Driving European recovery”35, and in parallel started a public consultation process 
on the future of financial services supervision in the EU 36  and, still in March, 
organised an international conference on a new supervisory architecture37. 
And on 27 May 2009 the Commission published the roadmap for a new supervisory 
framework for the EU.38 
                                                
33 Borio (2003): “The objective of a macroprudential approach is to limit the risk of episodes of financial 
distress with significant losses in terms of the real output for the economy as a whole. “ 
Borio (2014), “The macroprudential approach addresses the two drawbacks head-on by focusing on 
the system as a whole rather than on individual institutions - on the wood rather than the trees … 
The approach calibrates standards with respect to both the systemic footprint of individual institu-
tions (the so-called "cross-sectional dimension") and the evolution of system-wide risk (the so-called 
"time dimension"). In so doing, it also addresses what has come to be known as the "procyclicality" 
of the financial system - those self-reinforcing processes that amplify financial booms and busts and 
are at the root of financial crises.” 
34  Report, The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
Brussels, 25.2.2009, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf  
35  European Commission (2009).  
36  Consultation period 10.3-10.42009; 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/fin_supervision_en.htm.; press release: 
http://europa.eu//rapid/press-release_IP-09-373_en.htm  
37  “High-Level Conference «Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe», Bruxelles, 7 May 
2009; programme at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-
policy/docs/committees/supervision/070509programme_en.pdf 
38  “European financial supervision”, Commission of the EU, 27.5.2009, COM(2009) 252 final; 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/
C-2009_715_en.pdf  
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7)	   The European	   Systemic	  Risk	   Council	   (ESRC)	   and	   European	   System	  of	   Financial	  
Supervisors	  (ESFS)	  	  
With its communication of May 2009, the European Commission accepted the main 
proposals of the de Larosière Report, namely to recommend the establishment a 
European System of Financial Supervision and a European Systemic Risk Board, the 
latter body to be set up under the auspices of the ECB. 
a)	  ESRB	  
There are essentially two important new elements as regards the supervisory 
architecture. First, with creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)39 there 
is a new, centrally organised entity addressing macro-prudential issues, and second, 
the ESRB acts under the auspices of the ECB. The President of the ECB is 
Chairman of the Board and also chairs the Board’s Steering Committee. 
The role of the ESRB is to monitor and assess potential threats to financial stability 
that arise from macro-economic developments and from developments within the 
financial system as a whole ("macro-prudential supervision").  
To this end, the ESRB provides an early warning of system-wide risks that may be 
building up and, where necessary, issues recommendations for action to deal with 
these risks. The creation of the ESRB thus address one of the fundamental 
weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, which is the vulnerability of the financial system 
to interconnected, complex, sectoral and cross-sectoral systemic risks. 
The legislation to establish the ESRB did not, however, enter into force until 16 
December 2010 and the Board itself was established as from January 2011 and it 
published its first Annual Report in May 2012.40 
In Practice, the Board does the following: 
• collects and analyses all information relevant for monitoring and assessing 
potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-economic devel-
opments and developments within the financial system as a whole;  
• identifies and prioritises such risks;  
• issue risk warnings where risks appear to be significant;  
• where necessary gives recommendations on the measures to be taken in 
reaction to the risks identified;  
• monitors the required follow-up to warnings and recommendations, and  
• liaises effectively with the IMF, the FSB41 and third country counterparts.  
                                                
39  The Commission communication called the entity European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) and the 
current name was adopted later. 
40 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/ar/html/index.en.html  
41  www.financialstabiltyboard.org 
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b)	  ESFS	  
With the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), the EU created a formal 
network of national financial supervisors working in tandem with new European 
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”) to safeguard financial soundness at the level of 
individual financial firms and protect consumers of financial services ("micro-
prudential supervision").  
The ESFS consists of three European Supervisory Authorities: a European Banking 
Authority (EBA)42, a European Securities and Markets Authority, and a European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
The new European network goes beyond mere coordination or information exchange 
and is being built on shared and mutually reinforcing responsibilities, combining 
nationally based supervision of firms with centralisation of specific tasks at the 
European level. 
The hope is that this will not only foster harmonised rules but also a coherent 
supervisory practice and enforcement.  
As the Commission pointed out in its document, the network should be based on the 
principles of partnership, flexibility and subsidiarity. It would aim to enhance trust 
between national supervisors by ensuring, inter alia, that host supervisors have an 
appropriate say in setting policies relating to financial stability and consumer 
protection, thereby allowing cross-border risks to be addressed more effectively.  
As with the ESRB, the system became functional only once the required legislative 
steps were taken; the relevant text were published in December 2010, and the new 
authorities started to work on 1 January 2011. 
One needs to be aware, though, that the ESAs do not have real enforcement 
powers. However, by mid-2014 around 150 technical standards proposals were 
submitted by all ESAs to the Commission, and the ESAs have been instrumental in 
conducting peer-reviews. However, their activities have been more regulatory than 
supervisory, and, while they have no direct enforcement powers and their Guidelines 
are mostly non-binding43, the strongest tool at their disposal is “comply or explain”. 
                                                
42  https://www.eba.europa.eu. The European Banking Authority (EBA) is an independent EU Authority 
which works to ensure effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the 
European banking sector. Its overall objectives are to maintain financial stability in the EU and to 
safeguard the integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning of the banking sector. 
The main task of the EBA is to contribute to the creation of the European Single Rulebook in banking 
whose objective is to provide a single set of harmonised prudential rules for financial institutions 
throughout the EU. The Authority also plays an important role in promoting convergence of supervi-
sory practices and is mandated to assess risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector. 
43  ESAs can issue binding decisions under Articles 17 to 19 ESAs Regulation (e.g. on breach of law, 
emergency situations, binding mediation). 
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8.	  Towards	  a	  Banking	  Union	  
The creation of the two bodies, the ESAs and the ESRB, is however not the end of 
the story. After all, as a result of the crisis that emerged in 2008, the Commission 
pursued a number of initiatives to create a safer and sounder financial sector for the 
single market.  
In September 2012 Commission proposed a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)44 
for banks led by the European Central Bank (ECB) in order to strengthen the 
Economic and Monetary Union.  
The important additional step was that in September and October 2013 the EU 
formally adopted the creation of a bank Single Supervisory Mechanism that 
transferred certain supervisory powers directly to the ECB.45 It de-facto created a 
new institution in the ECB, the Supervisory Board that is separated from the 
monetary policy function. 
The set of proposals is a first step towards an integrated “Banking Union” which 
includes further components such as a single rulebook, common deposit protection 
and a single bank resolution mechanism. In detail, the proposals concern: 
• A regulation giving strong powers for the supervision of all banks in the euro 
area to the ECB and national supervisory authorities i.e. the creation of a sin-
gle supervisory mechanism; 
• A regulation with limited and specific changes to the regulation setting up the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) to ensure a balance in its decision making 
structures between the euro area and non-euro area Member States; 
• A communication outlining the Commission's overall vision for rolling out the 
banking union, covering the single rulebook, common deposit protection and 
a single bank resolution  
The organisational structure of the ESRB and ESFS is thus only one of several 
elements.  
The ECB now directly supervises the largest banks, and periodically the ECB now 
publishes a list of these institutions.  In fact, the ECB now supervises more assets 
and more global systemically important institutions than any other regula-
tor/supervisor in the world. 
Under the SSM, the national supervisors continue to monitor the remaining, smaller 
and not systemically important banks. The main task of the ECB and the national 
supervisors, working closely together within an integrated system, is to check that 
banks comply with the EU banking rules and to tackle problems early on. The “ex 
ante” common supervisory procedures include bank authorisation, withdrawal of 
bank authorisation and assessment of the acquisition of a qualifying holding. The role 
                                                
44   See instructive video by the ECB at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2t0Wt9hGUc 
45  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions. Available at http://bit.ly/1dJpPy9 . 
G Heinrich, European experience 
19 
 
of the national authorities in these procedures is limited to serving as an “entry point” 
(in the case of authorisations) or to initiating the procedure and consultations (in the 
case of withdrawals).46 
Apart from the Chairman, the Supervisory Board of the SSM has four representatives 
from the ECB, one representative from each national supervisory authority, and a 
representative from the European Commission as observer. Simple majority takes 
decisions and only for the adoption of regulations a qualified majority is required.  
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) applies to banks covered by the SSM. In 
the cases when banks fail despite stronger supervision, the mechanism will allow 
bank resolution to be managed effectively through a Single Resolution Board47 and a 
Single Resolution Fund, financed by the banking sector. It will however still take 
several years before the resolution fund will be fully financed and functional.48  
The SRM’s is to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with minimal costs for 
taxpayers and to the real economy.  
Finally, the Banking Union and the SSM also address the fact that during the 
financial crisis different countries applied different standards assessing banks. To 
ensure that the same rules are applied to all banks in the future, the new Single 
Supervisory Mechanism will rely on a set of rules, including capital requirements, 
depositor protection, and prevention and management of bank failures that are being 
brought together in the so-called “single rulebook”, the foundation on which the 
Banking Union sits. 
 
Banking Union 
Single Supervision Single Resolution 
Single Rulebook 
 
Banking Union applies to countries in the euro-areas but other EU countries may 
join. 
The Banking Union is an even more challenging tasks than the ones mentioned 
before, and setbacks can be foreseen in particular as regards a single resolution 
mechanism and a joint deposit-insurance scheme.49  
                                                
46  Nieto/Peñalosa, above, fn 24. 
47  http://srb.europa.eu 
48  The Single Resolution Fund was approved by the European Parliament on 15.4.2014 and 55bn 
euros will be financed in the course of the next 7 years. In December 2014, the Council of the EU 
reached a political on the bank contributions for such financing: Press Release ST 16645/14, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/146129.pdf See also 
Central Banking, “Europe’s banking union gets single resolution mechanism”, 20.3.2014; ACC, 
“Banking reform updater 11 - the single resolution mechanism examined”, 27.1.2015 
49  For national view of the Banking Union, for instance Veron (2014). 
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III.	  Challenges	  –	  does	  the	  new	  architecture	  work? 
We can see that in the last decades a multitude of reforms were implemented, each 
time introduced with the hope that they would work efficiently to ensure an adequate 
supervision of the financial system in the European context, only to be remodelled at 
the next signs of systemic tension. 
So the question remains whether the new architecture has been successful so far in 
achieving the desired goals. 
Obviously, the European authorities have an interest in this as well, not least as part 
of the accountability that any public institution should have vis-à-vis its constituents. 
But the regulations establishing the new European Supervisory Authorities and the 
ESRB include provisions to publish a general report on the experience acquired as a 
result of the operation within the ESFS and the ESFS as a whole. 
A consultation was launched in April 2013 and the first review reports were published 
in August 2014.50 
Overall, the report with respect to the ESAs mention that in spite of difficult circum-
stances the ESAs have quickly established well-functioning organisations. Overall 
they have performed well against their broad range of tasks, while facing increasing 
demands with limited human resources.  
However, as can be expected, the reports did highlight several areas where further 
improvement is required, both in the short term as well as longer term. Some would 
require further legislative changes, others not. 
A few of the suggested improvements are as follows. 
1)	  Proposed	  improvements	  for	  the	  ESAs	  
• Increase focus on supervisory convergence could be increased in order to 
ensure the consistent implementation and application of EU law, in particular 
more and better use of peer reviews, and more systematic follow-up  
• Enhance the transparency of the process for preparing draft technical stand-
ards or advising the Commission and ensure, where needed, high quality 
cost-benefit analysis 
• Give consumer/investor protection tasks a higher priority and make full use of 
available powers.  
• Enhance internal governance:  
• Transparency of the work of the stakeholder groups could be strengthened.  
• The role and influence of ESA staff within preparatory bodies, such as work-
ing.  
• Direct access to data by ESAs and strengthening of role of Chair or Managing 
Board in that respect 
                                                
50  Report on ESAs, 8.8.2014, COM(2014) 509 final: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-
policy/docs/committees/140808-esfs-review_en.pdf ; Report on ESRB: 8.8.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/pdf/2014-08-08_esrb_review_en.pdf  
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• Duration of mandates of stakeholder groups 
2)	  Proposed	  improvements	  for	  the	  ESRB	  
As regards the ESRB one needs to be aware that macro-prudential supervision is 
still in its infancy. The term “macro-prudential” has seen almost inflationary use51 and 
while the theoretical foundations have been laid down, the precise set of tools and 
the know-how how such tools and analysis interact with monetary policy is still being 
developed.  
The report on the ESRB is focused therefore more on the mission and organization 
of the ESRB. 
The ESRB Regulation stresses the preventive role of the ESRB in that it should 
‘contribute to the prevention of systemic risks’ and ‘avoid periods of widespread 
financial distress’. In addition, the ESRB should ‘identify and prioritise systemic risks’.  
It is difficult to assess the ESRB's performance as a forward-looking macro-
prudential authority given its only recent inception.  
Similar as with the ESAs, it is recognized that the ESRB is a key component of the 
ESFS, but stakeholders identified areas for improvement.  
These areas for improvement mainly relate to organisational identity, internal 
governance and the available tools (i.e. warnings and recommendations).  
Stakeholders have for instance called for:  
• Increased transparency to enact the “act or explain” mechanism 
• Better interaction with other European bodies 
• Better framing of ESRB intervention in the field of legislation so that ESRB 
views do not come at a very late stage of the legislative process 
• Enhancement of external communications 
• Improvement of exchange of data between ESRB and ESAs 
• Expand “tool box” to more “soft powers” in addition to the existing very “formal 
recommendations” that are cumbersome, often come late or, in one case, af-
ter the problem had already been addressed 
3)	  Banking	  Union	  and	  SSM	  challenges	  
As regards the Banking Union, of which the above-mentioned institutions are just one 
element, there is a more sceptical outlook. 
This starts with the practical observation that there will necessarily and correctly be a 
division of labour between national supervisory authorities and central SSM staff at 
the ECB; this raises practical questions of organisation and decision making, in 
particular. At the bottom of the system will be the various national supervisors each 
                                                
51  Clement (2010). 
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feeding up dozens if not hundreds of issues and matters for decision and action, with 
this volume surging in times of stress.52 The ECB also had to recruit between 800 
and 1000 new staff for this task, and will now keep on renting its former building to 
house its supervisory staff, while the core of the ECB moved to a new building in 
Frankfurt late last year, formally inaugurated just recently, on 18 March. 
As the report on the ESFS pointed out, “the establishment of a Banking Union, 
and notably of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) as its key components, will impact the functioning 
of the ESFS, but does not call into question its existence and necessity. To the 
contrary, the ESAs will continue to be responsible for the establishment of 
common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices and the consistent 
application of EU measures across the Single Market. An assessment of the 
interactions between the ESFS and the Banking Union would be premature at 
this stage but will be closely monitored in the future.”  
A researcher of a large commercial bank in the Eurozone pointed out, in my view 
correctly, that supervision, resolution and rulebook are strictly interconnected. 
Supervision without a single rule book would leave supervision fragmented and 
competition distorted and would incentivise member states to game the rules. 
Supervision without joint resolution would not break the vicious circle – and neither 
would resolution without burden- sharing. 53  Finally, joint resolution without joint 
supervision would create moral hazard.54 
On the other hand, the decisive move to have created a better integrated financial 
supervisory architecture in Europe may have contributed to the renewed trust by 
markets in the Eurozone, as evidenced by bond yields (see graphic below).55  
 
 
                                                
52  Elderfield (2013).  
53  See Goodheart/Schoenmaker (2006). 
54  DB Research, “EU Banking Union: right idea, poorly executed”, EU Monitor, 4.9.2003,  
55  Yardeni Research, Country briefing Eurozone, 12.3.2015; www.yardeni.com 
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IV.	  CONLUSIONS	  
The European experience shows that creating a common financial market and 
financial space is a lengthy, perhaps never ending process.  
This is even more the case where countries with different organizational and cultural 
traditions yet a common currency are required to cooperate, as at least the systemi-
cally important financial institutions have long ceased to operate merely on a national 
level. This has required the creation of structures that are also transnational and that 
go beyond a mere information exchange. 
The European experience can nevertheless be of use to the Caribbean. Having 
merely a set of MoU and entirely independent national supervisory authorities clearly 
did not work in the European context.   
For the Caribbean, in the absence of a common currency and centralized monetary 
and supervisory institutions, it is my personal view that in the short to medium term 
strong cooperative arrangements, paired with possible adaptions in governance56 
and accountability arrangements would seem preferable over creating a new 
centralized joint authority  
Strong cooperative arrangements could contribute to creating comparable and thus 
more easily compatible sets of rules, for instance as regards organizational structure 
of relevant institutions, as well as the tools for analysis and intervention. In other 
words having the same or largely similar organizational and regulatory arrangements 
in each country, but adopted individually, might be easier to arrive at than creating a 
joint body that issues rules that then become binding or need to be adopted in the 
region’s countries.  
And as banking federations are actively supporting the Banking Union concept in 
Europe and actively participate in the various consultative processes57, the Caribbe-
an Association of Banks might also be asked to provide active input to a regional risk 
assessment and management framework. 
It might also be useful to study the experience of other regions besides the EU that 
have tried to establish institutional frameworks for financial sector supervision or at 
least enhance the effectiveness of cross-border supervision.58 
In any event, if a joint assessment and management of risks in the Caribbean is 
envisioned, it would seem important to think hard of the organizational structure of 
                                                
56  See for instance, Caruana (2014). 
57  http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/ebf-tag/supervision-stability-and-structure/  
58  See section on “supervisory coordination” in CGFS (2014). 
As an example for the SADC region, see “Cross-border banking supervision in the SADC region”, 
ACM Insight, Vol 4, issue2, 2013, 
http://www.opml.co.uk/sites/default/files/ACM_INSIGHT__Volume_4_Issue_2_2013.pdf. On pro-
posals for Asia (including the never realised “Asian financial stability dialogue”): Kawai/Morgan 
(2014). For the West African Monetary Union: “Comité de stabilité financiêre” under the auspices of 
the BCEAO, http://www.bceao.int/Le-Comite-de-Stabilite-Financiere.html.  
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any cooperative framework, the decision making processes, governance, accounta-
bility and transparency and, last but not least, funding.   
The process is more complex than one might think and does not guarantee success. 
  
G Heinrich, European experience 
25 
 
References	  
	  
Borio, C., (2003), “Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and 
regulation?”, BIS Working Paper No. 128, February 2003. 
Borio, C, (2014), “Macroprudential frameworks: (too) great expectations?”, speech, BIS, 
5.8.2014, http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp140813.htm   
Caruana, J. (2014, “Redesigning the central bank for financial stability responsibilities” 
Speech on the occasion of the 135th Anniversary of the Bulgarian National Bank, BIS, 
June 2014. 
Clement, P. (2010), “The term "macroprudential": origins and evolution”, BIS, March 2010. 
CGFS (2014), “EME banking systems and regional financial integration”, CGFS Report No 51 
BIS, March 2014. 
CPMI (2014), Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPMI countries - 
Figures for 2013, BIS, December 2014. 
Delors, J. (Chairman) (1979), Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and 
Monetary Union, 17 April 1979, http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf 
ECB, “Eurosystem oversight report”, February regarding financial market infrastructures and 
payment instruments between 2011 and June 2014”, February 2015, 
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eurosystemoversightreport2014.en.pdf  
Elderfield, M., “Single Supervisory Mechanism – benefits and challenges from a practical 
supervisory perspective”, presentation, Brussels, 31 January 2013, 
http://www.bis.org/review/r130201b.pdf 
European Commission (1985), Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985). COM (85) 310 final, 14 
June 1985 
European Commission (2004), “Explanatory memorandum” regarding the Proposals for 
Directives to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and on the 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions,  COM(2004) 486, 14 July 
2004. 
European Commission (2009), Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving 
European Recovery”, 4.3.2009 COM(2009) 114 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0114:FIN:EN:PDF 
Goodhart, Ch. and Schoenmaker, D. (2006), “Burden sharing in a banking crisis in Europe”, 
LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, no 164, March 2006, and Sveriges 
Riksbank Economic Review, No.2, 2006, p.24-57. 
Heinrich, G. (2007), "Central Banking in a Regional Economic Setting: Possible Contributions 
to Integration", paper based on a presentation at the Central Bank of Barbados’ 35th 
Anniversary Lecture/Panel Discussion, 10 May 2007, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/47416 
Kawai, M. and Morgan, P. (2014), “Regional financial regulation in Asia”, ADBI Working 
Paper 460, February 2014. 
Nieto, M. and Peñalosa, J. (2004) “The European architecture of regulation, supervision and 
financial stability: A central bank perspective”, Journal of Banking Regulation (2004) 5, 
228–242.  
G Heinrich, European experience 
26 
 
Ogawa S., Park, J., Singh D., and Thacker, N. (2013), “Financial Interconnectedness and 
Financial Sector Reforms in the Caribbean”, IMF Working Paper WP/13/175, IMF, July 
2013. 
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2002), “Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring a Land in 
between” intervention at European Central Bank, Second Central Banking Conference: 
The Trans- formation of the European Financial System, 24–25 October 2002. 
Recine, F.  and Teixeira, P.G. (2009), “The new financial stability architecture in the EU”, 
Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No 2009-62, November 2009. 
Schoenmaker, D. (2009), “The financial crisis: Financial trilemma in Europe”, Vox, 19.12.2009 
(http://www.voxeu.org/article/financial-crisis-and-europe-s-financial-trilemma);  
Schoenmaker, D. (2011), “The trilemma of financial stability”, Economic Letters,  Volume 111, 
Issue 1, April 2011, Pages 57–59  Working Paper: SSRN #1340395.   
Schoenmaker, D. and Osterloo, S. (2014), “Financial supervision in an integrated Europe – 
Measuring cross-border externalities”, LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper 
Series, 2014, and International Finance, Vol.8, issue 1 (2005), p.1-37. 
Veron, N. (2014), “European Banking Union: Current outlook and short-term choices”, 
presentation at the conference “Banking union and the financing of the Portuguese 
economy”, Lisbon, 26.2.2014, 
www.bruegel.org/fileadmin/bruegel_files/Publications/PIIE_Testimony_Lisbon_Feb2014.p
df 
 
